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lN TilL SlJ!'l~L/IiL COURT OF Tl!E STATE Of UTAll 
----------------
T!JU!Zf\IM< DAVID HEABUlLlN and 
1-ii\RC:IL I!LAllLRLIN, his 1vife, 
----------
P1aintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
CITY Of FUN CARNIVAL, a 
partnership and LOUIS 
MELENJJLZ, 
vs. 
LOIS HHE.NDLZ, 
Defendants and 
Respondents, 
Third Party 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
----------
Case No. IS,214 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The determination of the tern's of partnership 
agreement, an accounting between the partners and the 
dissolution and winding up of the affairs of the partnership. 
DISPOSITION IN TilE LOWER COURT 
A brief trial was held after the court's denial 
of Respondents 1 two Jliotions for Summary Judgment. At the 
trial, the lo1ver court ruled there was a partnership, denied 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
respondents 1 counterclaiitt for money j udgn:ent on alleged 
promissory notes clue responclents froJtt appellants, orcll·reJ 
an accounting be maclc bct1vecn the pa1 tners anJ th<~t a referee 
be selected for this purpose; that the court 1vould issue a 
specific order ~or the referee to act within. This was not 
done. Appellant prepared and submitted a proposed order 
for this purpose. Respondents then filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment for the third time. Lower court then 
reversecl itself and granted respondents 1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants pray this court reverse the 
judgments of the trial court; to determine terms of the 
partnership agreement of the parties and to order an account-
ing and the winding up of the affairs of the partnership on 
the basis of the partnership agreement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the Spring of 1964, appellants entered into 
an oral partnership agreement with respondent Lou Melenclez 
who operated a traveling carnival known as the City of Fun 
Carnival. (Dave lleaberlin Deposition, Page 8, Lines 4-12; 
Margie Heaberlin Deposition, Page 9, Lines 1-9) Pursuant to 
said agreement, appellants were to have 50% s',are of the 
profits and losses of the business and were to have the 
-2-
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primary rcsponsihilitr of J<~aintcnance, repair, set-up, take-
Jcnm, clean up and moving all of the carnival equipment and 
suppLies. kespondent Lou !llelendcz was responsible for the 
"paper \VOrk", receipts, d.isbursen:ents and the handling of 
the JIIOHey. (llayd lleaberlin Deposition, Page 12, Lines 17-18, 
Lines 24-25; Page 13, Line l; Page 44, Line 8 to Page 45, 
Line 10; Page 47, Lines 5-16; Page 57,.Lines 9-21) Pursuant 
to this oral agreement, the business was operated by the 
partners on a S0-50 basis, both partners performing their 
primary responsibilities as agreed upon and as above described. 
The facts arc uncontroverted that respondent Lou Melendez 
prepared and filed U. S. Partnership Income Tax Returns for 
the years 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969; said Federal Partnership 
Income Tax Returns reflected equal ownership between appellant 
David lleaberlin and respondent Lou Melendez and reflected a 
financial statement and balance sheet of the partnership 
illustrating capital accounts and net worth of both partners; 
and further illustrating equal division of the profits of 
the partnership. (Deposition Louis Melendez, Jr., Page 32, 
Line 7 to Page 33, Line 10; Plaintiff's Memorandum June 16, 
1972, Po.int VI, Page 3, Lines 21-28) Appellant Dave lleaberlin 
and respondent Lou Melendez both signed and executed install-
Tdent contracts, doing business as City of Fun Carnival. (Dave 
lieaberlin Deposition, Page 49, Lines 21 to Page 53, Line 20; 
Page 54, Lines 12-25) One parcel of land located in Pleasant 
Grove, Utah County, State of Utah, was taken into the name 
-3-
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of appellant Dave lleaberlin and respondent Lou ~lelendez and 
the title to said land is still held in both names as partners. 
Several vehicles, trailers and tractors were taken into the 
names of appellant Dave lleaberlin and respondent Lou ~lelcnclez. 
Copies of these. registration documents were attached to 
appellants 1 -pleadings in opposition to respondents 1 several 
motions for summary judgment and are a part of the pleadings. 
Respondent Lou Melendez retained a majority of the earnings 
of the partnership in the business for the purpose of 
increasing the assets of the partnership and just minimal 
salaries were distributed on an equal basis to appellants and 
respondents. The financial statements of the partnership 
reflect a substantial accumulation of net worth in the partner-
ship business and the capital accounts of the partners. In 
January, 1965, respondent Lou Melendez contemplated incorporat-
ing the partnership business known as City of Fun Carnival. 
On about February 1, 1965, respondents prepared and presented 
to appellants for their signature a pre-incorporation agree-
ment. Appellants did not understand the proposed pre-
incorporation agreement and refused to sign. (Dave Heaberlin 
Deposition, Page 10, Lines 12-23; Page 40, Lines 10-24; 
Respondent Lou Melendez Deposition, Exhibit 1) Respondents 
continued to urge appellants to sign the document and 
represented to thern that it was to facilitate business dealings 
with third parties and would not effect the existing or future 
rights of appellants. Based upon this representation, 
-4-
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:tJ'!'cllant:; signed sa.id proposed prc-incoqJoration agreement 
on ;_~bouL fljc'Lil 18, 19(>7. (Dave llcabcrlln Deposition, l'at;e 
JO, Li.ne 12 to Page JJ, Line 6; Page 25, Line 21 to Page 
28, Line 30; Page 61, Lines 3-19; Exhibit l) Exhibit 1 of 
Lou l·iclenclez 's _Deposition provided as follows: 
"This agreement intered into on the lst 
of ~ebruary 1965 and to be tetroactive 
to January 2, 1965 is for sale of 45% 
of stock of City of Fun Carnival by 
Lou Melendez to Dave Heaberlin for the 
sum of $25,000.00 plus $5,000.00 to 
cover outstanding personal loans 
aqulrecl by Lou Melendez for the business. 
The sale is for the operating corporation, 
City of Fun Carnival Inc., and to pur-
chase 45% of the Lou Melendez Inc. hold-
ing Corporation. The sale is for portable 
carnival equipment only and for no other 
Lou Melendez interests or investments 
unless agreed to in writing. The sale 
is mainly for help in operating the 
carnival unit as no additional new cash 
is involved. Therefore if conditions 
become where this is impossible the 
sale is of no value and may be terminated. 
l. Dave is to work at least ll months 
every year in helping to operate 
and maintain carnival equipment. 
2. Purchasing of shares is for portable 
carnival equipment only and in no 
other of Lou's property or interest 
unless in writing. 
3. Complete inventory is to be taken 
of all Dave's equipment and credit 
given to him as to cost value. He 
must declare his personal inventory. 
4. Daves salary is to be from a "one" 
ball game, his wife is to operate 
unless changed by agreement of 
mutual consent. Ball game is to 
be operated when approved by Lou in 
-5-
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accordance to fair contracto; and 
!Jrivilage paid. 
4A. Daves salary is at all times 
paid in full by "une" ball 
game receipts. At no tit'te will 
wages be in arrears. 
4B. Dividends may be given when Lou 
feels necessary and appropriate 
by surplus. Dividends are to 
be paid according to stock 
holdings. 
5. bave is to at all time conform with 
the policies set up by Lou, especially 
of no fighting, drinking or unbusiness 
like conduct. He is to reveal to no 
one the business transactions between 
Lou and Dave. 
6. The assets are at all times to be in 
the name of Lou and the show will at 
all times do business through Lou 
and by him. Lou's decisions at all 
times will be final. 
7. The home of business will be in 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and as directed 
by Lou. Winter quarters will be in 
Utah unless directed otherwise by 
Lou. 
8. The sale of 45% of show stock to 
Dave is to be $25,000.00 plus 
$5,000.00 for additional bills made 
personally by Lou to personal friends 
and to be repaid by him, namely 
Robert Melendez, Sam Soccoli, and 
iJamediate family in-laws, etc, 
amount not to be more than $5,000.00 
no interest attached. 
9. In case Dave ever wants to leave 
or is bought out, it may be done by 
giving one months notice and he 
agrees to never work or have dealings 
in the area this carnival has ever 
showed with him, for S years to come. 
-6-
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10. JJavc, if he cl ects to leave the firm 
IV i l l n c v e r b c all o II' c d to 1 eave with 
any piece of property except fur the 
inventory he filed at begining of 
agreclllent and any added to list by 
Lou bought personally by Dave - all 
additions arc to be signed for by Lou. 
ll.· All equipment bought will be with 
company funds for the company. 
12. As carnival is efficient only in 
size at no time will the unit ever 
be divided for clisolvement of partner-
ship. 
13. Dave will be paid, in case of disolve-
ment, price agreed upon or by amount 
of stock paid into corporation by him 
and in no case more than the $25,000.00 
agreed purchase price and in san,e time 
period as paid for unless otherwise 
agreed upon. 
14. This partnership can be dissolved by 
Lou in case of Dave's failure to live 
up to Lou's policies and in case of 
disagreements between parties by using 
#13 as basis. 
15. Each party is to help form an efficient 
portable carnival to the best of their 
abilities. Dave is to have no other 
interest except in the fulfillment of 
this contract. 
16. Upon Dave's payment of $25,000.00 
for 45% of City of Fun Inc. for $1.00 
he may exercise the option to buy 45% 
of Lou Nelendez Inc. holding corpora 
tion of the carnival equipment. 
17. Dave is to pay $1,250.00 per year to 
Lou from summer earnings given from 
declared dividend, if business is 
financially able to and by majority 
stockholders vote. Five thousand 
dollars is to be paid as quickly as 
possible but never faster than sound 
judgement by Lou. Interest of 8% on 
- 7-
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stock payments arc' to be made only if 
in arrears. J>ayn:cn ts and all account 
ing is to be as of January 1, 1'16S for 
all practical purposes. lf more tl· •n 
$1,250.00 yearly dividend is decla· d 
at least 75% of Dave's share liiUSt J,,, 
il!Jplied tol>arus stock payments unt iJ 
full amount is paid. 
18. This contract becomes void and col-
lectable as to recourse in case of 
Dave's absence of longer than two 
months or for 1 week in time of 
operations. 
19. At no time will Dave be able to sell 
his interest to any party outside of 
Lou unless by inhertance to his wife 
only, and then no further unless 
approved by Lou in exercise of #13 by 
Lou to Dave and his wife's estate by 
their death. 
20. The main point in selling the 45% to 
Dave is for his assistance in main-
taining good quality maintenance on 
show and moving the unit efficiently. 
21. A $50,000.00 Life Insurance policy 
will be carried as of January 1, 1967 
on Lou Melendez and paid for by the 
City of Fun. Holder is to be company 
for the sole purpose of buying out 
Lou's share of portable carnival 
equipment and to sell to Dave Heaberlin. 
Equipment includes everything portable 
except personal items. Truck, car, 
trailer house, etc. Upon transfer of 
shares the balance due of Dave 
Heaberlin's original 45% purchase 
become a first mortgage on show. 
After five years from date of corpora-
tion agreement this clause may be 
re-negoia ted January 1, 1966." 
Exhibit 1 above was further evidenced by six stock 
subscription promissory notes in the amount of $5,000.00 each. 
Respondent Melendez 1;as to control the payment of the c,aid 
- 8 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:;tocL :;u!J.~cti]>Liun note~; out of proceed~ of the business as 
respurrJc·nt i•leleJlllc::., in his judgment, h'ould determine that the 
r.itllclritt•al ol said J.~OllC)' would not hurt the busjness. (Dave 
!lenl>erlin IJejJo:;itjon, Page 12, Line 19 to Page 13, Line 2; 
Page: 27, Line 21 to ]'age 30, Line 15; Sec Lxhibit l, paragraphs 
41i anJ paragraph 17) 
After Exhibit 1 was signed,. the business continued 
to operate as it !tad originally on a SO% division of profits 
and losses and the same responsibilities as prior to said pre-
incorporation agreement; respondents divided minir.tal salaries 
equall)' after said date and reinvested to excess profits back 
into the business. (Dave Heaberlin Deposition, Page 34, Line 
24 to Page 36, Line 11) This created capital accounts of the 
partners in excess of $200,000.00 each for appellants and 
respondents. 
The proposed corporation was never formed, no 
stock was issued, the stock subscription notes Here never 
cancelled by the respondents and respondents never made any 
clelilands for payJ;tent on said stock subscription notes until 
appellants commenced this action. Parties mutually terminated 
the pi.trtnership and appellants left the City of fun Carnival 
I 
on or ohout l·lay 21), 1970, after an argwnent provoked by anc.l 
lv.ith respondents herein. (Dave Heaberlin Deposition, Page 16, 
Line C) to !'age 17, Line 2 5) 
On February 9, 1971, Judge Joseph E. Nelson, the 
originitl tri.al judge, signed an Order which states as follows: 
-9-
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"lt js hereby ordered that the defendant 
Loui~ ~le.lcnclcz, Jr. be ~md the s;Jnte is 
hereby enjoined and restLlined ftom incur-
rjng any debts or obligaLiono-, <tg: in:,t the 
assets of the City of Fun Carni1 ·1 Juring 
the penclency of this action ancl Uit t i 1 
further hearing and orcler of this court. 
The court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for the 
appointment of a receiver at this time and 
directs that this matter be placed on the 
trial calendar to he tried Oll its merits 
at the earliest convenient trial setting. 
The court denied the balanc6 of plaintiffs' 
Motion except for the injunction concerning 
the incurring of additional indebtedness 
as hereinabove stated." I 
Contrary to this Order and without any subsequent 
order modifying the same, respondents encumbered the partner-
ship assets with an SBA loan. 
At the time of the mutual termination of the 
business by the partners, respondents had in their possession 
an automobile for their partnership transportation and a 
housetrailer in which they lived. The automobile and the 
housetrailer was later repossessed at the instance of the 
resp0ndents herein. 
Appellants commenced this action to compel 
respondents to account for the assets of the partnership, 
to distribute the same and wind up the affairs of the 
partnership; all after respondents refused to do so on 
request. 
On April 28, 1972, responclents flied a ~lotion 
for Summary Juclgment regarding partnership agrecPten t of the 
parties. On July 29, 1972, the above cntitlccl court denied 
-1 0-
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rc~Iwndcnts' ~lotion fo1· Summary Judgment. On November 3, 
1972, trial court l~sued a Pre-Trial Order bifarcating the 
ic;sucs for trial; first trlal relating to the partnership 
agreement and its effects of dissolution; the second issue 
referred to trial for an accounting between the former 
partners. On January 17, 1973, the trial court reversed 
itself and ruled that Exhibit 1 herein, ihe pre-incorporated 
agreement was the partnership agreement of the parties and 
that the only remaining issue was that of accounting among 
the former partners. Appellants' Motion for reconsideration 
and new trial on said issue was denied. On July 12, 1973, 
the trla1 court granted respondents' motion for protective 
order denying appellants the opportunity to discover the 
details of the SBA loan made by respondents upon the property 
of the partnership and contrary to Judge Nelson's previous 
order. Again on April 18, 1973, the trial court denied 
respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment for the second time. 
On February 6, 1974, the above entitled court made and 
entered a minute entry which provided in part as follows: 
"It is the order of the court that an 
accountant must be appointed to decide 
this matter or as an alternative the 
court will arrange to have Judge 
Harding hear the matter on its merits, 
with the losing party to bear the costs. 
The attorneys to make their own arrange-
ments for a reporter." 
" .... Upon request of both counsel and their 
clients the court hereby appoints Mr. Verlan 
Anderson to act as an accountant on the above 
-11-
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matter. The court to Jii<Jkc a de taj .I eel 
order and sulJJ:,it S;JJ;le to ~lr. Tay1cJJ 
andMr. Le~Vio;." 
The tr.ial court did not prcpan· such a dcLJilcd 
order before the referee:. Counsel for appc:l]ants prcparcd 
and submitted to the court a proposed detailed order for 
this purpose. Upon a third motion for summary judgment J:,aclc 
by respondents, the trial court on April 15, 1977, entered 
an Order and Judgment granting respondents' n.otion for 
summary judgment in all respects and. ordering that all of 
the property of the partnership belonged to respondents. The 
same )>Cnuine issues of controverted facts existed all through 
the Ir:otions and orders of the trial court, Hi thout the facts 
challging in auy respect. 
The pleadings \-Ji th respect to the above motion 
reflects the controverted facts of genuine issues to be tried. 
ARGU~!EN'J' 
POINT I 
TilE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT lNG SUMJILI\RY JUDGMENT 
TO RESPONDENTS ON TE~lS OF PARTNERSHIP AC;REUlENT, TllLl~E 1\UNG 
TilE FOLLOWING CONTROVERTED GENUINE ISSULS OF MATERIAL FACTS: 
A. WAS THERE AN OEAL PARTNERS!liP AGREUiENT BLT!VLEN 
ThE PARTIES. 
B. DID A PURPORTLD PRE -lNC:ORPOHATION AGREEMENT 
1-iODIFY HlE OEAL PARTNERSHIP AGRLE~lENT? 
(a) WAS TliERI: ADEQUATL CONSlDLl\'\TION FOF Till: 
PURPORTED AGRELNENT? 
(b) \\AS THL !lOCUJ\ILI\T Ui\lUI\SC:IO:,fdol.L Ai\!J 
nlElU:FURE li~HcNFOHCLJ\flLL? 
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(c) h"\S l'J LVLJZ PUT INTO FORCL AND .1\CTL!J 
UI'UN BY 'Jffl: 1'1\IZTIES? 
C:. \il!J\T \IJ:!ZL TliL TLR0IS Of TliE 1'.1\IZTNERSHIP AGREEi'iENT? 
l~lc 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
pro\·ide that summary judgment may be granted only if there 
is Il_l)__~_!llLLnc .i.ssue as to any material fact. In Rich vs. 
~lcGovern, Utah, 1976, 551 P2d 1266, this court rules as 
follows: 
"lnasmuch as the party moved against is 
being defeated without the privilege of 
a trial, the court should carefully 
scrutinize the 'submissions' and conten-
tions he makes thereon to see if his 
contentions and proposals as to proof 
of material facts, if resolved in his 
favor, would entitle him to prevail; 
and it so appears, the motion for 
summary judgment should be denied and 
a trial should be had ..... ," 
In the case now pending before this court there 
is and was several controverted genuine issues of fact. 
A. Was There An Oral Partnership Agreement 
Between The Parties? - The depositions of witnesses and the 
parties clearly disclose that an oral partnership was formed, 
assets were acquired in the partnership names of appellants 
and respondents, U. S. Tax Returns filed and prepared by 
respondents disclosing a partnership between the parties, 
their equal interest therein and balance sheet disclosing 
some of the assets of the partnership. The court originally 
ruled there was a partnership and ordered an accounting. 
-13-
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B. Did 1\ Purported Pre: Incorporation Agree~ 
Modify The Oral Partnership Agreement? -
(a) \\'as There .i\clequate Consideration For 
The Purported Agreement? - The depositions of appellants ancl 
respondents ful~y disclose that the proposed pre-incorporation 
agreement was lvithout any new or additional consideration. 
There is no evidence before the court in-the form of motions 
or otherwise disclosing consideration for this pre-incorporati~ 
agreement which was never acted upon between the parties. At 
the time the parties signed the pre-incorporation agreement 
they already had a partnership providing for equal rights in 
the business. (Dave Heaberlin Deposition, Page 8, Line 13 to 
Page 9, Line 24) Although entirely oral, this agreement was 
contracted in the presence of witnesses and was supported 
by more than adequate consideration, both parties furnishing 
equipment and promising to perform services. (Deposition 
Dave Heaberlin, Page 30, Line 10 to Page 33, Line 25; Page 45, 
Lines 11 to Page 47, Line 4) 
To be a valid modification of the prior agreement, 
the new agreement must have been supported by new considera-
tion. See 17 fun Jur. 2nd, Contracts Section 460. See also 
P.L.C. Landscape Construction vs. Piccadilly Fish and Chips 
Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P2d 562 (1972). A close examination 
of the pre-incorporation agreement reveals there is no new 
consideration whatsoever. (See respondent Melendez deposition, 
bxhibit 1) The document itself recites that "no additional 
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ncl'. ca:;lt is jnvolvcd". The corporation ,,·as never forr.1ecl and 
crock never issued. J\ppl'll ants' only course of income during 
the pel iod of the p:1rtners!tip \•I:JS the profits of the business, 
~Vh.iclJ v.ere disbursed solely by respondent Lou illelendez. 
(Depoc;ition !lave lieaberlin, Page 44, Line 8 to Page 45, Line 
10; Page 47, Line S to Page 48, Line 24) It was entirely 
with respondents' power to withhold profits and not credit 
appellant with his share and thus deprive appellant of the 
ability to pay for any such proposed stock. 
The respondents' only unconditionally promise was 
to "help form an efficient, portable carnival to the best of 
(his) aLiliti.es" which ,,-as an i"'plied covenant under the 
original oral partnership agreement and thus is not due 
consideration. 
(b) Was The Document Unconscionable and 
1berefore Unenforceable? - The facts clearly disclose that 
the respondents herein retained the power to withhold profits 
fro111 appell:mts herein, and not enable the appellants herein 
to pay for any stock in the proposed corporation that was 
never formed. This is expressly provided in the document 
itself. (See paragraphs 4B and 17 of Exhibit 1 to Respondent 
Melendez's Deposition) The intent of the parties is confirmed 
by the deposition of ])ave Heaberlin (page 45, Lines 17-25) 
and respondents' conduct confirms it. (Deposition Dave 
lieaberlin, Page 12, Line 19 to Page 12, Line 2; Page 28, 
Lines 2 J to Page 29, Line 2) 
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(c) l\'as It Lvcr Put Into Force And Acted 
Upon By The Parties?- The facb fully disclose that the 
corporation was never formed and no stock \\'as cveT sold or 
delivered. (Deposition Dave lleaberlin, Page 42, Lines 
23; Page 53, Line 21 to Page 54, Line 3) Both parties drew 
substantially equal amounts for living expenses o£ general 
receipts and the balance o£ the profits of the business was 
retained by the respondent in the business of the parties. 
(Deposition Margie Heaberlin, Page 22, Line 17 to Page 21, 
Line 6; Page 44, Line 11 to Page 45, Line 17; Deposition 
Dave Heaberlin, Page 34, Line 22 to Page 35, Line 13; Page 
48, Lines 5-24) In addition the respondent prepared and 
filed U.S. Partnership Returns for the years 1966, 1967, 1968 
and 1969, reporting the income as divided equally between the 
parties and said returns being filed after the purported pre-
incorporation agreement. (Deposition Lou Melendez, Jr., 
Page 32, Line 7 to Page 33, Line 12) 
When parties make a contract and subsequently 
act in a manner inconsistent with its continued existence, 
this raises a question of fact as to whether they have 
abandoned it or rescinded it. King vs. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 
285 P2d 114; Green vs. Garn, 11 Utah 2d 375, 359 P2d 1050. 
The facts disclose that the parties at all times acted in a 
manner inconsistent 1vi th the purported pre-incorporation 
agreement and continued to conform theiT conduct to the terms 
of their original oral agreement. 
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C. hhat Were The Terms Of The Partnership 
0_;_!::_~':::_11_1_("1_1_1:_7 - There is and has a genuine issue of material 
controverted fact as to the terms of the partnership agree-
!ltC!lt. Dcpositj.ons of witnesses and parties raised the 
issues as to what the terms of the partnership agreement 
were and the conduct of the parties disclosed what the 
terms of the partnership was. The evidence disclosed a 
50-50 partnership. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS 1 ~lOTION 
TO ALTER TflE JUDGMENT ENTERED At\ID FOR NE\\' TRIAL. 
The record is repleat with genuine issues of 
controverted facts which the court summarily dismissed on 
as inconsistent basis and reversing itself in the process; 
all of the facts being the same through all presentations 
and at a time when the court had heard no evidence from the 
hitnesses involved and permitting the same issues to be 
relitigated in the forms of motions for summary judgment, 
genuine controverted facts remaining the same at all times. 
The court expressly provided in its minute entry of February 
6, 1974, that the trial court would make a detailed order 
and submit the same to counsel; this was not done and 
counsel for appellants submitted such an order for the court 
in conformance with the court's previous ruling, which the 
trial court refused. 
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I'OJNT l J I 
TRIAL COURT LJWLD II\ GRN(J J;~c; SlJ.\J,'.L\FY JUT1C~IL\T 
ON ISSUf.S OF REQUEST !'OR J\CCOUNTII\G; lllLRL l\Lli~C CJ f\<lllNL 
ISSUES OF ~~TERIAL fACTS ON: 
J\. THE LO\I'ER CLIURT RULLD Tli!IT TIILRJ: ll'i\S 1\ 
PARTNL:l\SlliP J\ND OJWERLD AN J\CCOUNTING. 
B. WJ-(AT \VJ\S TilE VALUE OF TilL PARTNERS!liP'? 
C. \\'HAT WElZE TilE TERlliS OF TilE DISSOLUTION? 
A. The Lower Court Ruled That There \\'as A 
Partnership and ordered an accountin~. - The trial court 
expressly ruled that there was an issue of an accounting and 
ordered an accounting made on February 6, 1974. The court 
failed to provide a detailed order, counsel for appellants 
did so but the court refused the same and granted respondents 
summary judgment on the issue. 
B. \\'hat ll'as The Value Of The Partnership? - Then 
are financial statements indicating what the equity of the 
partners are in the business and show a substantial increase 
in value of the assets, that all of the assets are not dis-
closed in the financial statement and that at this point in 
time respondents are wrongfully being allowed to retain all of 
the retained earnings that he held in the coJ11pany after forcin:; 
appellants out. 
C. What Were The Terms Of The Dissolution? - The 
law has specific remedy for dissolution where the parties do 
not agree as to the terms and conditions of a d is,;olution. 'Jh, 
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purpurtc'd pre-incorporation agreement that 1,as never acted 
upon did not replace the original oral partnership agreement; 
the laws of the State of Utah expressly provide for the terms 
and conditions for dissolution of the partnership and the 
accounting and distribution of assets. This is the relief 
that this appellant has been seeking since the case was 
oribinally commenced. 
POINT IV 
TRIAL COURT'S ORIGINAL DENIAL OF RESPONDENTS' 
/.JOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DETERMINING CONCLUSIVE FACTS 
THAT ~lADE SUBSEQUENT MOTIONS FOR SUMMAJ<Y JUDGMENT BY 
RESPONDENTS MUTE. 
Rule 56(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Summary 
Judgment, expressly provides that where a case is not fully 
adjudicated on motion, that facts specified in the order 
shall be deemed established and the trial shall be conducted 
accordingly. The trial court's establishment of the fact 
that there was a partnership and ordered an accounting 
established those facts and that respondents last Motion for 
Summary Judgment, erroneously granted by the lower court, had 
no effect as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Parties herein formed a partnership under an 
oral agreement in which both parties shared on an equal basis. 
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They 1vorked under this oral agrce1:1cnt for G ycctrs duriJtg 11hic1t 
time su!Jstantial cap.i tal ~Vas earned and retaincJ in the partner, 
capital accounts. The Pre-Incorporation i\grecJ~:cnt in 1CJCi7 1, 35 
never put into force by the parties, there was no cons icleratio 11 
for it and its enforcement is unconscionabJe. These partie:; 
mutua.lly terminated the partnership in 1970. There are 
multiple genuine issues of material facts that prohibit the 
granting of Summary Judgment as was done by the lo1ver court. 
The effect of the trial court's ruling is to create an 
unconsc.ionab lc forfeiture of capital accounts of appellants 
of a sum in excess of $200,000.00. The lower court erred in 
granting Summary Judgment and in reversing itself on several 
occasions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
17'/1 0~ ~?,--~~~~~ 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR ,, MOODY 
Attorneys for Appellants 
55 Last Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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ChkTIFICATL OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two true and exact copies 
o[ the foregoing Brief of Appellants were mailed to S. Rex 
Lewis, 120 Last 300 North, Provo, Utah, 84601, this 8/:1_ day 
of 1\ugust, 1977·. 
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